AI fixes

nfq2/crypto/gcm.c

@@ -483,6 +483,7 @@ int gcm_auth_decrypt(
 	uchar check_tag[16];        // the tag generated and returned by decryption
 	int diff;                   // an ORed flag to detect authentication errors
 	size_t i;                   // our local iterator
+	int ret;
 
 	if (iv_len!=12 || tag_len>16) return -1;
 
@@ -491,18 +492,19 @@ int gcm_auth_decrypt(
 	   (which is an identical XORing to reverse the previous one)
 	   and also to re-generate the matching authentication tag
 	*/
-	gcm_crypt_and_tag(ctx, AES_DECRYPT, iv, iv_len, add, add_len,
-		input, output, length, check_tag, tag_len);
+	if ((ret = gcm_crypt_and_tag(ctx, AES_DECRYPT, iv, iv_len, add, add_len, input, output, length, check_tag, tag_len))) return ret;
 
 	// now we verify the authentication tag in 'constant time'
 	for (diff = 0, i = 0; i < tag_len; i++)
 		diff |= tag[i] ^ check_tag[i];
 
-	if (diff != 0) {                   // see whether any bits differed?
+	if (diff)
+	{
+		// see whether any bits differed?
 		memset(output, 0, length);    // if so... wipe the output data
 		return(GCM_AUTH_FAILURE);     // return GCM_AUTH_FAILURE
 	}
-	return(0);
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /******************************************************************************

nfq2/crypto/hkdf.c

@@ -60,9 +60,9 @@ int hkdf(SHAversion whichSha,
 	uint8_t okm[], size_t okm_len)
 {
 	uint8_t prk[USHAMaxHashSize];
-	return hkdfExtract(whichSha, salt, salt_len, ikm, ikm_len, prk) ||
-		hkdfExpand(whichSha, prk, USHAHashSize(whichSha), info,
-			info_len, okm, okm_len);
+	int ret;
+	if ((ret=hkdfExtract(whichSha, salt, salt_len, ikm, ikm_len, prk))) return ret;
+	return hkdfExpand(whichSha, prk, USHAHashSize(whichSha), info, info_len, okm, okm_len);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -146,6 +146,7 @@ int hkdfExpand(SHAversion whichSha, const uint8_t prk[], size_t prk_len,
 	size_t hash_len, N;
 	unsigned char T[USHAMaxHashSize];
 	size_t Tlen, where, i;
+	int ret;
 
 	if (info == 0) {
 		info = (const unsigned char *)"";
@@ -164,12 +165,11 @@ int hkdfExpand(SHAversion whichSha, const uint8_t prk[], size_t prk_len,
 	for (i = 1; i <= N; i++) {
 		HMACContext context;
 		unsigned char c = i;
-		int ret = hmacReset(&context, whichSha, prk, prk_len) ||
-			hmacInput(&context, T, Tlen) ||
-			hmacInput(&context, info, info_len) ||
-			hmacInput(&context, &c, 1) ||
-			hmacResult(&context, T);
-		if (ret != shaSuccess) return ret;
+		if ((ret=hmacReset(&context, whichSha, prk, prk_len))) return ret;
+		if ((ret=hmacInput(&context, T, Tlen))) return ret;
+		if ((ret=hmacInput(&context, info, info_len))) return ret;
+		if ((ret=hmacInput(&context, &c, 1))) return ret;
+		if ((ret=hmacResult(&context, T))) return ret;
 		memcpy(okm + where, T,
 			(i != N) ? hash_len : (okm_len - where));
 		where += hash_len;
@@ -321,9 +321,8 @@ int hkdfResult(HKDFContext *context,
 	if (!okm) return context->Corrupted = shaBadParam;
 	if (!prk) prk = prkbuf;
 
-	ret = hmacResult(&context->hmacContext, prk) ||
-		hkdfExpand(context->whichSha, prk, context->hashSize, info,
-			info_len, okm, okm_len);
+	if (!(ret = hmacResult(&context->hmacContext, prk)))
+		ret = hkdfExpand(context->whichSha, prk, context->hashSize, info, info_len, okm, okm_len);
 	context->Computed = 1;
 	return context->Corrupted = ret;
 }

nfq2/crypto/hmac.c

@@ -49,9 +49,10 @@ int hmac(SHAversion whichSha,
 	uint8_t digest[USHAMaxHashSize])
 {
 	HMACContext context;
-	return hmacReset(&context, whichSha, key, key_len) ||
-		hmacInput(&context, message_array, length) ||
-		hmacResult(&context, digest);
+	int ret;
+	if ((ret=hmacReset(&context, whichSha, key, key_len))) return ret;
+	if ((ret=hmacInput(&context, message_array, length))) return ret;
+	return hmacResult(&context, digest);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -101,10 +102,9 @@ int hmacReset(HMACContext *context, enum SHAversion whichSha,
 	 */
 	if (key_len > blocksize) {
 		USHAContext tcontext;
-		int err = USHAReset(&tcontext, whichSha) ||
-			USHAInput(&tcontext, key, key_len) ||
-			USHAResult(&tcontext, tempkey);
-		if (err != shaSuccess) return err;
+		if (ret=USHAReset(&tcontext, whichSha)) return ret;
+		if (ret=USHAInput(&tcontext, key, key_len)) return ret;
+		if (ret=USHAResult(&tcontext, tempkey)) return ret;
 
 		key = tempkey;
 		key_len = hashsize;
@@ -134,9 +134,9 @@ int hmacReset(HMACContext *context, enum SHAversion whichSha,
 
 	/* perform inner hash */
 	/* init context for 1st pass */
-	ret = USHAReset(&context->shaContext, whichSha) ||
+	if (!(ret = USHAReset(&context->shaContext, whichSha)))
 		/* and start with inner pad */
-		USHAInput(&context->shaContext, k_ipad, blocksize);
+		ret = USHAInput(&context->shaContext, k_ipad, blocksize);
 	return context->Corrupted = ret;
 }
 
@@ -197,8 +197,7 @@ int hmacFinalBits(HMACContext *context,
 	if (context->Corrupted) return context->Corrupted;
 	if (context->Computed) return context->Corrupted = shaStateError;
 	/* then final bits of datagram */
-	return context->Corrupted =
-		USHAFinalBits(&context->shaContext, bits, bit_count);
+	return context->Corrupted = USHAFinalBits(&context->shaContext, bits, bit_count);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -229,21 +228,16 @@ int hmacResult(HMACContext *context, uint8_t *digest)
 
 	/* finish up 1st pass */
 	/* (Use digest here as a temporary buffer.) */
-	ret =
-		USHAResult(&context->shaContext, digest) ||
-
+	if (!(ret=USHAResult(&context->shaContext, digest)) &&
 		/* perform outer SHA */
 		/* init context for 2nd pass */
-		USHAReset(&context->shaContext, context->whichSha) ||
-
+		!(ret=USHAReset(&context->shaContext, context->whichSha)) &&
 		/* start with outer pad */
-		USHAInput(&context->shaContext, context->k_opad,
-			context->blockSize) ||
-
+		!(ret=USHAInput(&context->shaContext, context->k_opad, context->blockSize)) &&
 		/* then results of 1st hash */
-		USHAInput(&context->shaContext, digest, context->hashSize) ||
+		!(ret=USHAInput(&context->shaContext, digest, context->hashSize)))
 		/* finish up 2nd pass */
-		USHAResult(&context->shaContext, digest);
+		ret=USHAResult(&context->shaContext, digest);
 
 	context->Computed = 1;
 	return context->Corrupted = ret;